In this paper, we dLscuss the approach we take to the interpretation of instructions. Instructions describe actions related to each other and to other goals the agent may have; our claim is that the agent must actively compute the actions that s/he has to perfomt, not simply "extract" their descriptions from the input.
Making sense of instructions
Consider the following three instructions:
(la) Go into the other room to get the urn of coffee.
(tb) Before you pick it up, be sure to unplug it.
(lc) When you bring it back here, carry it carefully with both hands.
Let's consider (la). To understand this instructiou, an agent must find the connection between ttle two actions a--go into the other room, and [3--get the urn of coffee.
The infinitival to alerts the agent to the fact that a contributes to achieving /3. General knowledge about physically getting objects requires that the agent move to the place where the object is located; therefore, the agent will infer that the (most direct) connection between these actitms has go into the other room fulfilling this requiremenL However, this is not enough. An assumption needs to be made for such connection to go through, namely, that the urn is in the other room.
This example shows that to make sense of instructions, an agent must engage in the active computation of the action(s) to be executed, and cannot simply "extract" all such information from the input. This differentiates our work from others', as we will discuss shortly.
Another important point that arises from (la) is that the relation contributes holding between c~, described in the matrix clause, and t, described in the purpose clause 1, can be specilied either as generation or enablement, as a study of naturally occurring purpose clauses [Di 92 In Unscrew the protective plate to expose the box, "unscrew the protective plate" enables "taking the plate off" which generates "exposing the box".
In [Po186] , it is shown that these two relations are necessary to model action descriptions conveyed by Natural Language. We would like to add one further observation: such relations allow us to draw conclusions about action execution too. Tbis is quite useful since we do have to execute (it., animate) the input iustractions, as our work is taking place in the context of the Animation from Natural Language (AnimNL) project at the University of Pennsylvania [WBD*91I.
As far as generation is concerned, while two actions arc described, only a, the generator, needs to be performed; instead, if c~ etmbles t, after executing ~r, fl still needs to be executed. In fact, if cx enables t, cr bas to begin, but not necessarily end, before/3. I We am using the term purpose clauses to informally designate robordinate clausel --such as those introduced by to --that express the igenI'l pmpog in executing the action delcdbed in the matrix clause. In both eases, the goal/3 also constrains the interpretation and / or execution of c~. An example of this as regards generation is (2) Cut the square in half to create two triangles.
The only action to be performed is cut the square in half. However, there is an infinite number of ways to cut a square in half: the goal create two triangles restricts the choice to cut the square along one of the two diagonals.
We turn next to the second instrnctiQn (lb), Observe that the agent understands pick up to be part of the sequence that achieves get the urn of coffee. This is not warranted by the preposition before: if (lb) were Before you ruin it, be sure it's unplugged, the agent clearly shouldn't infer that ruin it is part of getting the urn! This shows that in before c~, /3, the action e~ is not necessarily part of achieving a certain goal, even if/~ is, As far as (lc) goes, the agent has to understand that bring it back here is part of achieving getting the urn; that carry it carefully with both hands generates bring it back here, provided that carry it carefully with both hands is augmented with the destination back here. Notice that the action description carry it carefully with both hands is fairly complex, sporting two modifiers in addition to the traditional arguments of agent and patient,
Problems and Proposed Solutions
The following conclusions can be drawn from the observations in the previous section:
1. NL action descriptions are fairly complex, including modifiers of many different types--see also [WD90] . An action representation formalism must be able to deal with complex descriptions, such as carry it carefully with both hands; with descriptions at different levels of abstraction, such as go and walk to, or such as cut the square in half and cut the square in half along the diagonal in (2).
NL instructions include a wide variety of construetions, such as purpose clauses and temporal clauses.
Instruction interpretation systems must be able to deal with complex imperatives and with the relations between actions that they express.
3. An instruction interpretation system cannot assume that the descriptions of the actions to be performed are equivalent to the logical forms computed by the parser: such logical forms have to be constrained in various ways, e.g. by computing assumptions, as in (la), or more specific action descriptions, as in (2) 2. Notice that these coustralnts derive from the interaction between the actions to be executed and the goals 21n thi~ paper we will ~ly discuss the former type of co~st.raint competition; the latter ii diJoassed in [Di 92b ]. the agent adopts. It is essential that this interaction is taken into account by such systems.
Work done in the past on understanding instructions has generally concentrated on simple positive commands, and has failed to address some of the desiderata listed above:
[VB90] limits the interaction between new and preexisting goals to inserting the new goals in the list of goals if their execution does not violate preexisting constraints, otherwise they am rejected. [Cha91] proposes a model of instruction interpretation which seems useful at the level of the basic skills an agent is endowed with, but in winch there is no internal structure to actions, and no distinction between the agent's actions and goals.
[AZC91] instead does assume a rich relation between instructions and preexisting goal(s). However, instructions are not continually integrated into the plan the agent is developing; instead they are used as a resource when the stored knowledge about plans cannot be adapted to the situation at hand.
Turning now to our proposal, our approach to these problems includes
1. An action representation formalism based on Jackendofrs Conceptual Structures [Jac90].
2. An action KB that contains simple plans that represent common sense knowledge about actions.
3. A plan graph that represents the structure of the agent's intentions.
Action representation
We have chosen to use Jackendoff's Conceptual Structures [Jac90] for two reasons. First, as our point of departure is NL, there are the obvious benefits of using a linguistically motivated representational theory, e.g. easing the burden upon the parser to produce such representations [Whi92] . Second, there is significant mileage to be gained from using a decompositional theory of meaning, insofar as the primitives effectively capture important generalizations. In this section we introduce the notation and some minor modifications to the theory as presented in [Jae90]. We use Go into the other room as a representative example. In Jackendoff's theory, an entity may be of ontological type Thing, Place, Path, Event, State, Manner or Property. The conceptual structure for a room is shown in (3a) below:
Square brackets indicate an entity of type Thing meeting the enclosed featural description. Small caps indicate atoms in conceptual structure, which serve as links to other systems of representation; for example, the conceptual structure for a kitchen (3b) differs from that of a Having such a representation is also useful for computing qualifiers and effects in a systematic way: they can be precompiled from tile representation itself. For example, for every action including a component ?J such as we know tlmt after 6, j must be at 1, theretore we can include this in the effects of the action. Given the filrther restriction that j cannot be in two places at once, we may infer that j cannot be at l now, and thus precompnte the qualifier s .
The plan graph
The plan graph represents tile structure of the intentions that the agent adopts as a response to the instructions. It keeps hack of the goals the agent is pursuing, of the hierarchical relations between the goals and the actions whose execution achieves such goals, and of various relations between the actions. It also helps interpret tile instructions that follow. In (t), establishing the initial goal get the urn of coffee provides the context in which the two following instructions have to be interpreted--a similar strategy is adopted for example by [Kau90]. In Fig. 2 , we show the complete structure built after interpreting (1).
A node in a plan graph contains the Conceptual Structure representation of an action, augmented with the consequent state achieved alter the execution of that action 9. The arcs represent relations between actions; among them, those relevant to our example are: temporal, such as precedes in Fig. 2 ; enablement; generation, and its generalization substep, used when ~ belongs to a sequence of more than one action that generates 3-BJickendoff suggests something antlogous with his inference rules, which have yet to be form~lizea.
°In Fig. 2 There may also be assumptions associated with a plan graph. If an assumption is derived from the quMifiers associated with an action, it is associated with the node describing that action--A2 in Fig. 2 ; if it is derived while inferring a rehdion between two actions, it is associated with the corresponding arenA1.
The plan graph is built by an interpretation algorithm that takes as its input the logical form constructed by the p,'wser. The algorithm works by keeping track of the active nodes, which include the goal currently in focus, and the nodes just added to the tree. The topmost level of the algorithm invokes different procedure.s, according to the particular syntactic construction at hand -e.g. the construction Do c~ to do/3 will trigger the hypothesis that either generates or enables fl [Di 92b ]. These procedures retrieve the plan(s) associated with the goal currently in focus, and then expand such plans in a hierarchical fashiou.
These procedures embody various inference processes, that can be characterized either as planning--e.g, plan expausion, subgoaling--or as plan inference---e.g, inferring assumptions, inferring the more abstract goal some actions are supposed to achieve. Space doesn't allow as to go into further details about the algorithm or the inference proeesses; rather, in the next section we will give an example of how assumptions are computed.
Making an Assumption
We will now show how the assumption that the urn is to be found in the other room is made while processing (la), Go into the other room to get the urn of coffee.
The process begins with the following representation constructed by the parser, where the FOR-function (derived from the to-phrase) encodes the contributes relation holding between the go-action ~, and the get-action B: room only in its choice of constant, leaving the determination of their similarities and differences to a system of representation better suited to the task 3.
To distinguish instances of a type, we follow [ZV91] in requiring every conceptual stnlcture to have an index:
Conceptual structures may also contain complex features generated by conceptual functions over other conceptual structures. For example, the conceptual function IN: Thing Place may be used to represent the location in the room as shown in (5a) below. Likewise, the traction TO: Place Path describes a path that ends in the specified place, as shown in (5b) --(5c) is an equivalent representation of (5b), where the index 1 stands for the entire constituent4:
(5c) [Path TO (I) ]., To complete our clause 5, it remains only to add the conceptual function GO: Thing × Path ~ Event:
AS there is no subject in our clause, the constituent i (pragmatically, the AGENT) in (6) is left unspecified.
To distinguish Walk into the other room from (6), we include an indication of manncr~:
L Finally, semantic fields, such as Spatial and Possessional, are intended to capture the similarities between sentencas like Jack went into the other room and 7"he gift went to Bill, as shown in (8) below:
The idea is that verbs like go leave the semantic field underspecified, whereas verbs like donate specify a particular field. In addition to these semantic fields, we propose to add a new one called Control. It is intended to represent the functional notion of having control over some object. For example, in sports, the meanings of having the ball. keeping the ball. and getting the ball embody this notion. and are clearly quite distinct from their Spatial and Possessional counterparts; (9) represents Jack got the ball:
3In our c.as*, th~ action representation formalism is grounded in the animation system serving as the back~nd to the AnimNL project.
4We win often adopt the tcpte.tentation in (5c), and leave out indices and ot~tological types, in order to hi~en the typographical berden of rep~seafing large c.~ccpmal stmcturct Slgnodng, of course, the meaning of other for now. e Though tiff s is clearly intended. Jackendoff never explicitly ~presc~nt~ such a distincfiota. 
3.1
The action KB
The action KB contains simple plans that represent common sense knowledge about actions, and whose components are expressed in terms of Jacketldofffs semantic primitives. To discuss the characteristics of these plans, we will refer to the move-action KB entry shown in Fig. 1 , which might be described as follows: go to wherej is, get control over it, then take it to 17. Actions have a header and a body. This terminology is reminiscent of planning operators; however we express the relations between these components in terms of enablement and generation---e.g, the body generates its header.
The representation does not employ preconditions, because it is very difficult to draw the line between what is a precondition and what is part of the body of an action. One could say that having control over the object to be moved is a precondition for a move-action. However, if the object is heavy, the agent will start exerting lorce to lift it, and then carry it to the other location. It is not obvious whether the lifting action is still part of achieving the precondition, or already part of the body. Therefore, we don't have preconditions, but only actions which are substeps in executing another action, that is, they may belong ZThis do-it-younelf method is bet one way to move something front where it is to somewhere else. Other 
] k
Given the presence of the to phrase, we know that a may be part of a sequence of actions that generate ft. To pursue this hypothesis, we begin by looking up fl in tile action KB. /3 matches the general move-action shown in Fig. 1 Once the instruction is understood itt this way, the two actions may be incorporated into the plan graph ,'ts shown in Fig. 2 . One should mention that assumption (11) could of course be wrong, say if there were a note in the next room saying ha ha, it's not really in this room but the next.
Notice that even if there is already an urn of coffee in the current room, the instraction Go into lhe other roortl lo get the urn of coffee is still understood to refer to an um in the other rcmm. This contrasts sharply with Go into the other room to wash out the urn of coffee, where the most likely urn is the currently visible one. In the current framework, this difference would be captured in the following way. Unlike itt the case of the get-action, the go-action matches tile following subaction of wash-out: TIterelore, assumption (11) will not be derived, permitting the possibility of the urn being in the current room.
Summary and Future Research
We have presented an approach to action representation and instruction interpretation which we feel is more llexible than previously proposed formalisms: it allows us to use terms at different levels of specificity, and to perform the complex inferences that NL instructions require.
Fnture research includes exploring how to integrate a hierarchical organization of entities, actions and plans with the action KB.
The system is being implemented in Quintus Prolog, with substantial progress having been made in particular on the parser [Whi92] , and on the action KB.
